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ARTICLES
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
John C. Lynch *
Jon S. Hubbard **
M. Elizabeth Woodard *
I. INTRODUCTION

This article summarizes the major developments in Virginia
civil practice and procedure over the past two years, specifically
covering significant decisions by the Supreme Court of Virginia
and changes to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia dating
from April 22, 2005, to April 20, 2007. The article also addresses
legislative enactments by the General Assembly in its 2005 and
2006 sessions.
II. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

A. Choice of Law
In Dreher v. Budget Rent-A-Car System, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that a New York statute imposing vicari-

ous liability on the owner of a vehicle for death or injuries caused
by the negligence of a person driving the car with the owner's
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permission applied to the plaintiffs' personal injury action involving an accident in Virginia. 1 The plaintiffs sued the defendant car
rental companies alleging that the liability created by New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law section 388(1)2 was a matter of contract,
and therefore, under Virginia's choice of law rules, the plaintiffs
could recover against the defendants. 3 The defendants argued
that the issue was a matter of tort, and, under the doctrine of lex
loci delicti, the defendant owners had no vicarious liability for the
acts of the permittee under Virginia law.4
The issue turned on whether the alleged liability under Virginia Code section 388(1) was a matter of tort or contract.5 Virginia's choice of law rules applied because the automobile accident at issue occurred in Virginia.6 If the defendants' alleged
liability was a matter of tort, then the law of the place of the
wrong would govern all matters related to the right of action.7 If
it was a matter of contract, however, then the law of the place
where the parties entered into the contract controlled-in this
case, New York.8
By holding in favor of the plaintiffs, the court found Buchanan
v. Doe9 persuasive.' 0 The plaintiffs claim in Buchanan involved
the uninsured motorist statutes of Virginia and West Virginia."
Under West Virginia law, a plaintiff in a John Doe tort action
must prove actual, physical contact with the John Doe vehicle.' 2

1.
2.

272 Va. 390, 393, 634 S.E.2d 324, 325 (2006).
The New York statute states:
Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in [New York] shall be liable and
responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or
otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission,
express or implied, of such owner.
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 388(1) (Consol. 1992). Contrarily, under Virginia law, the plaintiffs in Dreher would have needed to show some form of agency relationship in order to
sustain a claim of vicarious liability against the rental car owners. Dreher, 272 Va. at 394,
634 S.E.2d at 326.
3. See Dreher, 272 Va. at 395-96, 634 S.E.2d at 326-27.
4. See id. at 395-97, 634 S.E.2d at 326-28.
5. Id. at 395, 634 S.E.2d at 327.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 246 Va. 67, 431 S.E.2d 289 (1993).
10. Dreher, 272 Va. at 398, 634 S.E.2d at 328.
11. 246 Va. at 69-70, 431 S.E.2d at 290.
12. Id.

2007]

CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Virginia's uninsured motorist statutes, however, have no such requirement. 3 The Supreme Court of Virginia in Buchanan held
that the issue was a matter of contract between the plaintiff
driver and his uninsured motorist insurance carrier because neither state's tort law required proof of physical contact, and West
Virginia's proof-of-contact rule neither imposed a duty on the
John Doe driver nor benefited a tortfeasor. 14
Similarly, in Dreher,the alleged liability of the owners was created solely by the New York statute.15 Further, "[tihe provisions
of N.Y. Law § 388 are a matter of substantive law and go to the
very right of action at issue. " " The New York statute imposed no
duty on the tortfeasor and did not benefit any tortfeasor.17 Thus,
the statute was designed to protect motorists and imposed a
"'contractual duty upon the [owner of the vehicle] having no relation to [the underlying] tort action."'' 8 Accordingly, the New York
statute was contractual in nature and the defendants were potentially liable on plaintiffs' personal injury claims. 9
B. DeclaratoryJudgment
In Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Pacific Employers Insurance
Co., the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court retained jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action to determine
an insurer's obligations under a liability insurance policy after
the insurer voluntarily paid a settlement on the underlying tort
action against the insured.2" The insured was sued by one of its
employees after the employee suffered injuries in an automobile

13. Id. at 69, 431 S.E.2d at 290.
14. Id. at 71-72, 431 S.E.2d at 291-92.
15. Dreher, 246 Va. at 399, 634 S.E.2d at 329.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 400, 634 S.E.2d at 329 (quoting Buchanan, 246 Va. at 73, 431 S.E.2d at
292). The court held further that the application of the New York statute did not offend
the public policy of the Commonwealth because both favor the "compensation of innocent
victims in automobile accidents." Id., 634 S.E.2d at 330.
19. See id. at 398, 634 S.E.2d at 328. The court acknowledged its disagreement with
the Fourth Circuit's holding in Kline v. Wheels by Kinney, Inc., 464 F.2d 184 (4th Cir.
1972), because there the Fourth Circuit held that section 388(1) was purely a matter of
tort law and therefore North Carolina's tort law prevented a claim against the defendant
rental owners. Dreher,272 Va. at 397-98, 634 S.E.2d at 328.
20. See 269 Va. 399, 402, 409, 611 S.E.2d 531, 532, 536 (2005).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:229

accident. 21 The employee brought suit in West Virginia alleging
personal injury against the insured.22 Meanwhile, the insurer
filed suit in Virginia seeking a declaration that it was not liable
on the policy with the insured. 23 The insured filed an answer asserting the declaratory action was improper because it sought a
"determination of disputed issues that must be determined in
some future litigations between the parties."24
Eventually, the employee, insured, and insurer entered into
settlement negotiations on the underlying tort claim.25 The insurer repeatedly asserted that its participation was made with
reservation of its rights "as determined in the pending declaratory judgment proceeding." 26 With this in mind, the insurer
agreed to fund a settlement of the employee's claims against the
insured.27 After the tort claim settled, the Virginia trial court
held in favor of the insurer in its declaratory action, ruling that
the employee was acting within the scope of his employment at
the time of the
accident, and, therefore, the insurer was not liable
28
on the policy.

The insured appealed, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory action after the insurer made a voluntary payment to resolve the underlying tort
claim. 29 "In such instances, . . . the real purpose of the [declaratory judgment action] is to obtain a money judgment," making the
declaratory judgment an improper method to obtain relief.3 ° Citing Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bishop,3 ' the insured argued
that the settlement of the underlying tort claim extinguished the
trial court's jurisdiction in the declaratory judgment action be-

21. See id. at 403, 611 S.E.2d at 532-33.
22. See id.
23. Id., 611 S.E.2d at 533.
24. Id. at 404, 611 S.E.2d at 533.
25. Id. The insurer was not a party to the underlying tort claim.
26. Id. at 405, 611 S.E.2d at 534.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 406, 611 S.E.2d at 534.
29. Id., 611 S.E.2d at 535.
30. Id. at 407, 611 S.E.2d at 535 (citing Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 211 Va.
414, 421, 177 S.E.2d 519, 524 (1970)).
31. 211 Va. 414, 177 S.E.2d 519.
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cause "there was no longer an actual controversy between" the insured and the insurer.3 2
The supreme court ruled that the trial court properly retained
jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action.33 Contrary to
the facts in Bishop, the insurer's declaratory judgment action was
filed before it agreed to fund the settlement. 34 The reservation of
rights established that the insurer's interests were divergent
from the insured's.3 5 Furthermore, the court in Reisen v. Aetna
Life & Casualty Co.,36 held that an insurer is permitted to file a
declaratory judgment action while an action on the underlying
tort claim is pending. "
The court rejected the insured's argument that the declaratory
judgment action had become a suit for money damages.3 ' The
trial court had subject matter jurisdiction when the insurer filed
the claim, and "[i]t should be self-evident that after a declaratory
judgment action is filed the circumstances that caused the party
seeking to have its rights and responsibilities determined by the
court in equity may change."3 9 Moreover, a court of equity retains
jurisdiction once acquired and may complete adjudication "'to the
extent of establishing legal rights and granting legal remedies
which would otherwise be beyond the scope of its authority."'4 °
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in retaining jurisdiction after the insurer's voluntary payment on the underlying tort
claim. 1
C. FinalJudgment
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined in two decisions
what effects, if any, a scrivener's error may have on a final judgment. In Morgan v. Russrand Triangle Associates, the court held

32. Asplundh Tree, 269 Va. at 405, 611 S.E.2d at 534.
33. Id. at 409, 611 S.E.2d at 536.
34. See id. at 404-05, 611 S.E.2d at 533.
35. Id. at 408, 611 S.E.2d at 535.
36. 225 Va. 327, 302 S.E.2d 529 (1983).
37. See Asplundh Tree, 269 Va. at 408, 611 S.E.2d at 535 (citing Reisen, 225 Va. at
336, 302 S.E.2d at 534).
38. See id., 611 S.E.2d at 536.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 409, 611 S.E.2d at 536 (quoting Erlich v. Hendrick Constr. Co., 217 Va. 108,
115, 225 S.E.2d 665, 670 (1976)).
41.

See id.
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that a trial court's "inadvertent" entry of a final order disposing of
the merits of a claim did not constitute a clerical error. 42 The trial
court entered a final order signed by the parties in favor of the
plaintiff.43 Although the court granted Defendant's motion to reconsider and issued an oral ruling in favor of the defendant, no
written order to that effect was entered by the court within
twenty-one days after the original final order.44 Eventually, the
trial court entered a second written order stating that the original
final order had been entered due to a clerical error.4 5
The supreme court disagreed, holding that the entry of the original final order did not constitute clerical error. 46 Therefore, Virginia Code section 8.01-428(B) did not apply and the trial court
erred in entering a nunc pro tunc order modifying that final order.47 "Characterizing the signing of the order by the trial judge,
and by counsel for both parties, as an 'oversight' or an 'inadvertent error' is inconsistent with the affirmative acts of the trial
court and counsel." 48 Along with all of the parties, the trial court
is charged with the knowledge that an order is entered when
signed by the judge. 49 Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 1:1, the trial
court lost jurisdiction over the matter at the expiration of twentyone days after entry of the final order, notwithstanding the
court's oral ruling otherwise. °
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed a related issue in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Remley.5 1 In
Remley, the trial court mistakenly entered a final order in which
the court juxtaposed the parties' names.5 2 After the expiration of
twenty-one days, pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-428, the
court modified the final order to reflect the correct positioning of

42. See 270 Va. 21, 26-27, 613 S.E.2d 589, 591-92 (2005).
43. See id. at 24, 613 S.E.2d at 590.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 26, 613 S.E.2d at 591.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 26-27, 613 S.E.2d at 591-92.
51. 270 Va. 209, 618 S.E.2d 316 (2005).
52. See id. at 213, 618 S.E.2d at 317. In the order, the trial court inadvertently stated
that Craig Griffin was the plaintiff, even though Christine Remley was the plaintiff and
Griffin the defendant. Id.
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the parties.5 3 The uninsured motorist insurance carrier moved to
set aside the final order, arguing in part that the trial court "reacquired" jurisdiction in the matter by modifying the final order
under Virginia Code section 8.01-428(B). 4 The trial court disagreed and the supreme court affirmed, holding that a trial
court's authority under Virginia Code section 8.01-428(B) is limited only to those issues specifically set forth in the statute. 5 Further, Virginia Code section 8.01-428(B) and other statutes creating exceptions to the finality of Rule 1:1 are consistently applied
narrowly by the courts. 6
D. JudicialEstoppel
In Parson v. Carroll,the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a
criminal defendant's Alford plea will not support a trial court's
application of judicial estoppel.5 7 The plaintiff plead guilty to six
counts of sexual battery against the defendant.5 " Plaintiff did so
by entering "Alford pleas,' in which he asserted his innocence but
stipulated that the evidence presented, if credible, was sufficient
to convict him."59 Approximately five months later, the plaintiff
filed suit against the defendant victim for making allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff related to the sexual battery.6" The circuit court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that plaintiffs Alford pleas barred his claims. 6
The purpose of the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel "is to
protect the integrity of the judicial process and to guard it from
improper use."62 Under the doctrine, a party is prohibited from
asserting conflicting or contradictory positions, with regard to the

53. See id. at 215, 618 S.E.2d at 319.
54. See id. at 220-21, 618 S.E.2d at 322.
55. Id. at 221, 618 S.E.2d at 322.
56. Id. (citing McEwen Lumber Co. v. Lipscomb Bros. Lumber, 234 Va. 243, 247, 360
S.E.2d 845, 848 (1987)). The court also rejected the defendants' assertions that the plaintiff had committed actual or constructive fraud by moving for default judgment. Id. at 218,
618 S.E.2d at 321.
57. See 272 Va. 560, 565, 636 S.E.2d 452, 454 (2006).
58. Id. at 562, 636 S.E.2d at 453.
59. Id. See generally North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (giving rise to the
term "Alford plea").
60. See Parson, 272 Va. at 563, 636 S.E.2d at 453.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 564, 636 S.E.2d at 454; see also New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742,

749-51 (2001).
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same fact or facts, in successive legal proceedings.6 3 The doctrine,
however, does not prevent a party from asserting contradictory
legal positions.6 4 Thus, the issue in Parson was whether the
plaintiffs Alford plea constituted a factual or legal assertion by
the plaintiff.65
The court held that the plaintiff maintained a position of law in
making his Alford plea because he "conceded only that the evidence was sufficient to convict him of the offenses and did not
admit as a factual matter that he had participated in the acts
constituting the crimes."66 Therefore, the remedy of judicial estoppel was improper because the plaintiff did not assert conflicting factual positions.6 7 Further, the issue of whether plaintiff actually committed the defamatory acts was a question of fact, and
therefore, the circuit court erred in granting the extraordinary
remedy of summary judgment.6 8
E. Medical Malpractice
In Harris v. Kreutzer, the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized a limited cause of action for medical malpractice arising out
of a Rule 4:10 independent medical examination ("IME").6 9 In the
underlying personal injury action, the claimant alleged that she
sustained traumatic brain injury in an automobile accident."° The
trial court ordered the plaintiff to submit to an IME conducted by
the defendant, a licensed clinical psychologist specializing in neuropsychology.7 1 Plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached the
applicable standard of care by failing to appropriately examine
and evaluate the mental condition of the plaintiff, and by being
deliberately abusive to the plaintiff during the examination.7 2
The defendant contended that there was no physician-patient
relationship between the parties in a Rule 4:10 examination, and,
63. See Parson,272 Va. at 565, 636 S.E.2d at 454 (citing Bentley Funding Group v. SK
& R Group, 269 Va. 315, 325, 609 S.E.2d 49, 53-54 (2005)).
64. See id. (citing Bentley Funding,269 Va. at 326, 609 S.E.2d at 54).
65. See id. at 566, 636 S.E.2d at 455.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See 271 Va. 188, 198, 624 S.E.2d 24, 30 (2006).
70. Id. at 193, 624 S.E.2d at 27.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 194, 624 S.E.2d at 27.
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as a result, the plaintiffs claim of medical malpractice must fail
as a matter of law.7 3 The court disagreed and ruled instead that
pursuant to Rule 3:1 the plaintiff had impliedly consented to a
Rule 4:10 medical examination by placing her mental condition at
issue in the underlying personal injury claim.7 4 According to the
court, the parties had therefore formed a limited physicianpatient relationship for the purposes of the examination." 5
The court ruled further that the IME doctor had a cognizable
duty under the Medical Malpractice Act, Virginia Code sections
8.01-581.1 to 8.01-581.20:1, the breach of which could sustain a
claim for malpractice for conduct during the examination.7 6 Virginia Code section 8.01-581.1 defines malpractice as "any... action for personal injuries ... based on health care or professional
77
services rendered . . . by a health care provider, to a patient."
The court held that the statutory definition of "health care",7 was
broad enough to encompass a medical diagnosis conducted for the
benefit of parties involved in litigation, including the court.7 9
Thus, a Rule 4:10 IME is "health care" within the meaning of section 8.01-581.1.80
Although the court recognized a cause of action for malpractice
arising out of a Rule 4:10 examination, it added that "the scope of
such a cause of action is very limited."8 ' The Court held:
The physician's professional duty in the conduct of a Rule 4:10 examination relates solely to the actual performance of the examination. Unlike a physician in a traditional physician/patient relationship, a Rule 4:10 examiner has no duty to diagnose or treat the
patient, and no liability may arise from his report or testimony regarding the examination. Because the Rule 4:10 examination functions only to ascertain information relative to the underlying litiga-

73. Id. at 195, 624 S.E.2d at 28.
74. Id. at 199, 624 S.E.2d at 30.
75.

Id.

76. See id. at 200, 624 S.E.2d at 31.
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007); Harris, 271 Va. at 199, 624 S.E.2d
at 31.

78. "Health care" is defined as "any act.., performed... by any health care provider
for [or] to . . . a patient during the patient's medical diagnosis." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01581.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
79. See Harris,271 Va. at 199-200, 624 S.E.2d at 31.
80. Id. at 200, 624 S.E.2d at 31.
81.

Id.
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tion, the physician's duty in a Rule 4:10 setting is solely to examine
82
the patient without harming her in the conduct of the examination.

By limiting the scope of the examining physician's liability, the
court recognized the "policy imperative that Rule 4:10 malpractice actions not be used to intimidate physicians from undertaking court-ordered examinations or to manipulate the outcome of
such an examination."83
The Supreme Court of Virginia has also interpreted the definition of "health care" in the increasingly important area of nursing
home care. In Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes, Inc., the court held
that the exclusivity provisions of the malpractice statutes did not
bar the plaintiffs claims for negligence and sexual assault and
battery against the nursing home defendant.8 4 Four days after
checking into the nursing home, the decedent was sexually assaulted by an unknown assailant.8 5 The plaintiff administrator
alleged that his claims involved administrative, personnel, and
security decisions made by the defendant, rather than health care
or professional services rendered by the nursing home. 6 The
court agreed, giving a limited reading of the statutory definitions
by holding that "the definitions of 'malpractice' and 'health care'
apply to patients on an individual basis, rather than to the staffing and security of any medical facility in which the patients are
located."" Accordingly, Virginia Code section 8.01-581.1 did not
bar plaintiff's claims for negligence and sexual assault and battery. 8
F. Nonsuit
In a decision that was effectively reversed by legislative enactment,8 9 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a trial court may
grant a plaintiffs motion for a second nonsuit despite the plaintiffs failure to provide notice to the defendant. 9 The plaintiff in

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 201, 624 S.E.2d at 31.
Id., 624 S.E.2d at 32.
See 272 Va. 37, 43-44, 630 S.E.2d 301, 304 (2006).
Id. at 40, 630 S.E.2d at 302.
Id. at 43, 630 S.E.2d at 304.
Id.
See id. at 44, 630 S.E.2d at 304.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
See Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 367, 634 S.E.2d 754, 761 (2006).
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Janvier v. Arminio took her voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-380(B) after failing to effect service of
process on the defendant within the one-year period prescribed by
Virginia Code section 8.01-275.1.9 ' Plaintiff filed a second similar
medical malpractice claim, but once again failed to serve the defendant within one year.9 2 The trial court granted her motion for
a second nonsuit and plaintiff filed her third motion for judgment,
this time successfully serving the defendant with process within
the statutory period.9" Plaintiffs multiple filings and motions had
the practical effect of extending the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions 94 to approximately four-anda-half years.95 Defendant was not aware of the previous nonsuit
96
orders before filing responsive pleadings to the third complaint.
The defendant asserted that Virginia Code section 8.01-380 required a plaintiff to give notice to the defendant before the trial
court could properly grant a motion for a second nonsuit. 97 Accordingly, the trial court's order awarding the second nonsuit was
void ab initio and therefore, the third complaint was time-barred
by the statute of limitations while the second complaint remained
an open case.9" The court disagreed. Justice Koontz wrote that it
is the "duty of the courts . . . 'to construe the law as it is written.' 9 9 Further, "nothing in the language of [Virginia] Code §
8.01-380(B) suggests that the General Assembly intended to place
any additional restriction on the granting of the second nonsuit
other than to leave the matter to the trial court's discretion or the
concurrence of the parties." 1° Therefore, absent any fraud on the
part of the plaintiff, Virginia Code section 8.01-380 (as it existed

91. See id. at 359, 634 S.E.2d at 756.
92. Id.
93. Id., 634 S.E.2d at 757.
94. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
95. Plaintiff was last treated by the defendant doctor on November 14, 1999. Janvier,
272 Va. at 359, 634 S.E.2d at 756. Her first lawsuit was filed on May 21, 2001, and nonsuited on June 3, 2002. Id. Pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-229(E)(3), plaintiff filed
the second lawsuit on October 7, 2002. Id. She nonsuited the second action without notifying defendant on December 4, 2003, and filed her third claim on May 27, 2004. Id., 634
S.E.2d at 757.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 360, 634 S.E.2d at 757.
98. Id. at 361, 634 S.E.2d at 758.
99. Id. at 366, 634 S.E.2d at 761 (quoting Hampton Rds. Sanitation Dist. Comm'n v.
City of Chesapeake, 218 Va. 696, 702, 240 S.E.2d 819, 823 (1978)).
100. Id., 634 S.E.2d at 760.
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then) did not require notice to the defendant for motions for a
second nonsuit.'0 ' Despite its endorsement of judicial restraint,
the court appeared to suggest that the interests of justice would
best be served by allowing all parties to address the trial court
when ruling on a motion for a second nonsuit 0 2 The General Assembly apparently listened, amending Virginia Code section 8.01380 to require reasonable
notice to defendants before allowing a
0 3
nonsuit
second
The Supreme Court of Virginia issued several other rulings
over the past two years involving motions for nonsuits. In Williamsburg Peking Corp. v. Kong, the court held that a motion for
sanctions survives an order granting a nonsuit because the motion "has no bearing on the facts giving rise to the right to seek
judicial remedy."1" 4 Furthermore, according to the court, the
"General Assembly never intended that a nonsuit order could exonerate a litigant's misconduct." 10 5
The court held in Nerri v. Adu-Gyamfi that an order granting a
nonsuit is invalid where the movant attorney's law license has
been suspended.' 6 In Bio-Medical Applications of Virginia, Inc. v.
Coston, the court ruled that a plaintiffs motion for nonsuit was
untimely after submission of the matter to the trial court on
summary judgment-despite the trial judge's request for any additional motions after rendering his verdict. 107 Finally, in Berry v.
F&S FinancialMarketing, Inc., the court held a motion for nonsuit timely where it was filed prior to submission of the defendant's motion to dismiss based on the one-year service of process
requirement of former Rule 3:3(c). 0

101. See id. at 367, 634 S.E.2d at 761. The court's ruling in Janvier is an extension of
its earlier opinion in Waterman v. Halverson, 261 Va. 203, 540 S.E.2d 867 (2001). In
Waterman, the court ruled that notice is not required for a plaintiffs voluntary nonsuit.
Id. at 208, 540 S.E.2d at 869.
102. For example, the court noted that "[bloth future plaintiffs and defendants might
well benefit should the General Assembly amend Code § 8.01-380 by providing a requirement for notice or the exercise of due diligence to give notice to a defendant when a plaintiff seeks a second or subsequent nonsuit." Janvier,272 Va. at 357, 634 S.E.2d at 755.
103. See Act of Mar. 15, 2007, ch. 367, 2007 Va. Acts 510 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
104. 270 Va. 350, 354, 619 S.E.2d 100, 102 (2005).
105. Id.
106. See 270 Va. 28, 31, 613 S.E.2d 429, 430 (2005).
107. See 272 Va. 489, 494-95, 634 S.E.2d 349, 351-52 (2006).
108. See 271 Va. 329, 333-34, 626 S.E.2d 821, 823-24 (2006). Former Rule 3:3(c) required service of process on a defendant within one year of filing. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:3(c)
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G. Physician Immunity
In what may be one of the most short-lived decisions in its history, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued a decision interpreting
a physician's immunity under Virginia Code section 8.01-581.18,
and then overruled the decision four months later. 10 9 In Auer v.
Miller, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death claim against one of
the defendant physicians for failing to properly review and evaluate a medical report.'1 0 The court affirmed the trial court's grant
of immunity to a physician pursuant to former Virginia Code section 581.18(B). 111 It stated in part:
Any physician shall be immune from civil liability for any failure to
review, or to take any action in response to the receipt of, any report
of the results of any laboratory test or other examination of the
physical or mental condition of any person, which test or examination such physician neither requested nor authorized in writing,
unless such report is provided directly to the physician by the person
so examined or tested with a request for consultation or by the State
Department of Health. 112

The evidence showed that another treating physician authorized the report." 3 Furthermore, there was no indication that the
decedent provided the defendant with a copy of the report requesting consultation.11 4 The court rejected plaintiffs assertion
that the statutory immunity was not intended to apply to attending physicians, stating "[h]ad the General Assembly intended to
limit the statute's application to outpatient situations, it could
have so stated.""' 5 Therefore, the defendant's immunity was
based on his failure to review the report of his own patient.'1 6

(2004) (repealed 2006). It has been replaced by Rule 3:5(e). See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:5(e).
109. See Auer v. Miller, 270 Va. 172, 174, 613 S.E.2d 421, 422 (2005), overruled by
Oraee v. Breeding, 270 Va. 488, 491, 621 S.E.2d 48, 49 (2005).

110. See id. at 174-76, 613 S.E.2d at 422-23.
111.

Id. at 177, 613 S.E.2d at 424.

112.

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.18(B) (2005) (repealed 2006).

113.

See Auer, 270 Va. at 177, 613 S.E.2d at 424.

114. Id.
115. Id., 613 S.E.2d at 423. Plaintiff's claims against the physician who requested the
report and two medical practice groups were not barred. A jury returned verdicts against
the co-defendant physician and the practice groups, but the award against one of the practice groups was vacated by the trial court on other grounds. Id. at 175, 613 S.E.2d at 422.
116. See id. at 177, 613 S.E.2d at 424.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia revisited the issue approximately four months later, overturning Auer in Oraee v. Breed' In Oraee, the plaintiff asserted that subsections A and B of
ing. 17
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.18 must be read together and that
subsection A limited the applicability of subsection B to situations
where a non-physician has ordered the medical report. 118 Virginia
Code section 8.01-581.18(A), as it existed when Oraee was decided
in 2005, stated in part:
Whenever a laboratory test or other examination of the physical or
mental condition of any person is conducted by or under the supervision of a person other than a physician and not at the request or with
the written authorization of a physician ... [s]uch report shall state
in bold type that it is the responsibility of the recipient to arrange
and interpretation of the results
with his physician for consultation
19
of such test or examination. 1

"According to the plaintiff, the intent of the statute [was] to direct the appropriate course of action when an individual, as opposed to a physician, requests a laboratory test or examination." 2 ' The plaintiff argued that subsection B must have related
only to instances involving reports and examinations ordered by
non-physicians. 2 '
The court admitted in Auer that it had failed to consider
whether subsection B must be read in light of subsection A.' 22
Applying well-known rules of statutory interpretation, the court
noted: "'[A] statute should be read and considered as a whole, and
the language of a statute should be examined in its entirety to determine the intent of the General Assembly from the words contained in the statute.""2 3 Separate sections of a statute should be
interpreted to provide a "'consistent and harmonious whole,"'
thereby effectuating the "'legislative goal. '""'2 4 Accordingly, the immunity granted in subsection B "in essence follows the report de-

117. 270 Va. 488, 491, 621 S.E.2d 48, 49 (2005).
118. See id. at 498-99, 621 S.E.2d at 53.
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.18(A) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
120. Oraee, 270 Va. at 496, 621 S.E.2d at 51-52.
121. Id., 621 S.E.2d at 52.
122. Id. at 497-98, 621 S.E.2d at 52.
123. Id. at 498, 621 S.E.2d at 53 (quoting Dep't of Med. Assistance Servs. v. Beverly
Healthcare of Fredericksburg, 268 Va. 278, 285, 601 S.E.2d 604, 607-08 (2004)).
124. Id., 621 S.E.2d at 52 (quoting Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Bd. of County Supervisors,
226 Va. 382, 387-88, 309 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983)).
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scribed in subsection A." 125 To hold otherwise would lead to consequences the General Assembly never envisioned in enacting
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.18.126
Justice Agee, in a strongly worded dissent, stated that the
court's unanimous decision in Auer was the correct interpretation
of Virginia Code section 8.01-581.18(B). 127 Justice Agee criticized
the majority for its "passing reference" to the doctrine of stare decisis, stating that "[p]rior decisions of this Court are entitled to
respect and deference."'12 ' The majority's cursory reversal of Auer,
in the dissenters' view, "lessens the value of stare decisis" and
"'tends to bring adjudications of the tribunal into the same class
' 12
as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only."' 1
Justice Agee attacked the judgment on substantive bases as well,
noting that the court's own precedent contains numerous examples of statutory subsections being read and applied separately. 130
Furthermore, the General Assembly could have easily inserted
language into subsection B that would have clearly limited its
application to situations governed by subsection A, but it did
not.'' Finally, the majority's concern for the "unintended consequences" of the plain statutory
language was a matter for the leg32
islature, not the judiciary. 1
H. Pro Se Representation
In Kone v. Wilson, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that the
administrator of a decedent's estate may not file a wrongful death
action pro se.133 After the plaintiff administrator filed suit, the defendants moved to strike the motion for judgment, asserting that
13
the plaintiff was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

125. Id. at 499, 621 S.E.2d at 53.
126. Id. The court gave the example of a physician who performs surgery on a patient
even though a report ordered by another treating physician indicates that surgery is not
necessary. According to Auer, the surgeon would be immune under section 8.01-581.18(B).
Id.
127. Id. at 500-01, 621 S.E.2d at 54 (Agee, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 501, 621 S.E.2d at 54.
129. Id., 621 S.E.2d at 55 (quoting Newman v. Erie Ins. Exch., 256 Va. 501, 510, 507
S.E.2d 348, 353 (1998) (Compton, J., dissenting)).
130. See id. at 505, 621 S.E.2d at 57.
131. Id. at 507, 621 S.E.2d at 58.
132. Id. at 508, 621 S.E.2d at 58.
133. 272 Va. 59, 62-63, 630 S.E.2d 744, 746 (2006).
134. Id. at 61, 630 S.E.2d at 745.
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The trial court denied the motion to strike but held that the
plaintiff could not proceed without representation. 135 An attorney
entered an appearance for the administrator, but the defendants
again moved to strike based on the grounds that the plaintiff had
not filed any pleading that would have tolled the statute of limitations.1 36 The circuit court agreed with the defendants, granted
the motion to strike, and dismissed the claim with prejudice.13 7
On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that the administrator "steps
into the shoes" of the decedent and may "initiate an action pro se
and be sued in [the decedent's] name." 3 ' Plaintiff further contended that the circuit court abused its discretion in not allowing
the plaintiffs counsel to file an amended complaint and in not allowing the attorney's signature to relate back to the plaintiffs initial pleading.' 39
The supreme court held in favor of the defendants, ruling that
a wrongful death action is a statutory creation and must be applied according to Virginia Code section 8.01-50,140 which allows
the decedent's personal representative to bring an action for
wrongful death on behalf of the decedent's beneficiaries;' however, "the personal representative merely acts as a surrogate for
the decedent's beneficiaries."142 The plaintiff was unable to maintain an action for himself and therefore had no right to file the
43
lawsuit pro se. 1
Furthermore, because the plaintiff had no right to file the action pro se, the trial court could not enter an order allowing an
amended complaint bearing the signature of an attorney because
"[an amendment to a pleading 'presupposes a valid instrument
as its object.""' The initial filing was invalid and therefore precluded an amended complaint. 145 Similarly, the signature of
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
746.
142.
143.
144.
Corp.,
145.

Id.
Id. at 62, 630 S.E.2d at 745.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., 630 S.E.2d at 745-46.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007); Kone, 272 Va. at 62, 630 S.E.2d at
Kone, 272 Va. at 62, 630 S.E.2d at 746.
Id. at 62-63, 630 S.E.2d at 746.
See id. at 63, 630 S.E.2d at 746 (quoting Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Harman Mining
264 Va. 279, 283, 568 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2002)).
Id.
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Plaintiffs attorney could not relate back to the initial filing because there were no valid proceedings pending before the trial
court.'4 6 Plaintiffs initial filing was a nullity that could not be
recognized by the court without condoning the unauthorized practice of law.'47 Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs
claim with prejudice.' 48

I. Sanctions
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the issue of sanctions
in several decisions over the past two years. The most important
decision is almost certainly the opinion in Ford Motor Co. v.
Benitez.'4 9 In a decision sure to cause a stir in both the plaintiffs'
and defendants' bar, the court affirmed a trial court's sanctioning
of a defense counsel for asserting affirmative defenses that were
not "well-grounded in fact" pursuant to Virginia Code section
8.01-271.1.'1° The court appeared to limit the well-known practice
of including any affirmative defense-regardless of whether the
defense is applicable-in the defensive pleadings. The ruling in
Benitez, however, may not be as far-reaching as the plaintiffs' bar
might hope. The opinion concludes with an axiom familiar to
plaintiff and defense attorneys alike: "In no event may counsel
file a pleading he knows to be unfounded in fact."''
The plaintiff in Benitez filed suit alleging injuries from a defective air bag. 152 The plaintiff conducted extensive discovery but
nonsuited the claim before trial.'53 The plaintiff filed a second
suit on the same cause of action approximately five months later
and the defendants asserted thirteen affirmative defenses. 1 Af-

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
See id.
Id.
273 Va. 242, 639 S.E.2d 203 (2007).
See id. at 245, 253, 639 S.E.2d at 204, 208.
Id. at 253, 639 S.E.2d at 208.
Id. at 245, 639 S.E.2d at 204.
Id.
See id. at 246, 639 S.E.2d at 204. The defendant asserted that it would
"rely on the following affirmative defenses, if applicable, and if proved at
trial" . . . (1) contributory negligence, (2) assumption of the risk, (3) negligence of third parties, (4) failure to state a cause of action, (5) lack of notice of
warranty claims as required by the Uniform Commercial Code, (6) failure to
mitigate damages, (7) claim barred by terms of limited warranty, (8) unauthorized misuse or alteration of vehicle by plaintiff or others, (9) failure to
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ter the trial court granted Plaintiffs motion to strike some of the
defenses for lack of factual support, the plaintiff moved for sanctions under Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1."' The court granted
the motion, holding that the defenses were not grounded in fact
when the pleading was signed, and the court awarded $2,000 in
5 6
sanctions against the defendants' attorney. 1
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision, noting
that the issue of sanctions turns on a mixed question of law and
fact. 5 7 Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1 provides that an attorney's signature has a two-prong effect: by signing a pleading, the
attorney certifies that the pleading is well-grounded in fact to the
best of his or her knowledge, and the pleading is supported by
law, or a good-faith argument to change the existing law. 5 '
Therefore, a trial court first must determine the attorney's actual
knowledge of the facts and whether the attorney's understanding
of the facts is based on a reasonable inquiry.159 Further, the court
must assess whether the pleading is supported by legal authority
or a well-founded argument to change the law. 16o
Unlike the supreme court's prior rulings involving Virginia
Code section 8.01-271.1, the affirmative defenses asserted by the
defendants in Benitez involved solely the first prong of this analysis-whether the defenses are fact-based.' 6 ' Accordingly, the outcome depended on whether the pleading was grounded in fact,
based on the signing attorney's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry. 6 2 Because the original claim was

comply with terms of warranty, (10) constitutional bars respecting punitive
damage claims, (11) bars imposed by the applicable statute of limitations,
(12) "all other defenses that may become applicable or available up to and including the time of trial," and (13) "release and/or accord and satisfaction."

Id.
155. Id. at 247, 639 S.E.2d at 205. The court struck the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, negligence of a third party, failure to mitigate damages, unconstitutionality of punitive damages, and the statute of limitations. Id. The court reserved judgment on the warranty defenses and the defendants withdrew the remaining
affirmative defenses. Id.
156. Id. at 248, 639 S.E.2d at 205-06.
157. Id. at 249, 253, 639 S.E.2d at 206, 208.
158. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007); Benitez, 273 Va. at 249-50, 639
S.E.2d at 206.
159. Benitez, 273 Va. at 250, 639 S.E.2d at 206.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 250-51, 639 S.E.2d at 206-07.
162. Id., 639 S.E.2d at 207.
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nonsuited after the parties conducted extensive discovery, it was
clear that the signing attorney knew the affirmative defenses
163
were not supported by the facts.
The court rejected the defendants' argument that the pleading
merely reserved the defenses "if applicable, and if proved at trial,"
ruling instead that "the fundamental purpose of pleadings... [is]
to 'inform the opposite party of the true nature of the claim or defense.""'
The defendants' attempt to reserve potential defenses
constituted the very type of abuse of process which Virginia Code
section 8.01-271.1 was enacted to prevent.165 The court explained
that the defendants should move to amend their pleadings as
66
facts come to light supporting new defenses. 1
Based on Benitez, a word of caution is warranted before moving
for Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1 sanctions in every case because the opinion is very fact-specific. The plaintiff nonsuited and
refiled the exact same claim; the defendant's attorney's pleading
of inapplicable affirmative defenses was clearly improper after
the same parties and counsel took part in full discovery. 16 7 Defense attorneys would be well-advised to conduct thorough inquiries into the facts of each lawsuit before pleading affirmative defenses in future cases.
In Nusbaum v. Berlin, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
a trial court does not have inherent authority to discipline an attorney by awarding monetary sanctions consisting of attorneys'
fees and costs. 16 The incident arose out of an alleged physical
contact between the parties' attorneys.'6 9 During trial, one of the
plaintiffs' attorneys requested a brief bench conference. 170 As the
bailiff later testified, while standing at the side bar, the plaintiffs'
counsel allegedly shoved the defendants' counsel with his el-

163. Id. at 251, 639 S.E.2d at 207.
164. Id. at 251-52, 639 S.E.2d at 207 (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:4(d)).
165. Id. at 252, 639 S.E.2d at 207.
166. Id., 639 S.E.2d at 208. For an interesting corollary to the issue of pleading affirmative defenses, see Monahan v. Obici Medical Management Services, Inc. where the
court held that the defense of mitigation of damages need not be specifically pled in order
for a defendant to assert it, "provided the issue has otherwise been shown by the evidence." 271 Va. 621, 632, 628 S.E.2d 330, 336 (2006).
167. See Benitez, 273 Va. at 251, 639 S.E.2d at 207.
168. 273 Va. 385, 390, 641 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2007).
169. See id. at 390-91, 641 S.E.2d at 496.
170. Id. at 390, 641 S.E.2d at 496.
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bow.171 Because the alleged altercation occurred in sight of the
jury, the trial court declared a mistrial and turned to the issue of
punishing the offending attorney. 172 The attorneys involved in the
dispute disagreed as to whether the contact by the plaintiffs' attorney was intentional or inadvertent. 7' 3 After briefing and oral
argument from both sides, the trial court eventually sanctioned
the plaintiffs' attorney in the amount of the defendants' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 7 4 The court awarded the defendants a total amount of $52,738.88.17
The plaintiffs' attorney appealed the decision, arguing that "the
purpose of the trial court's inherent power to discipline an attorney is to protect the public, not to punish the attorney or to compensate the parties."'7 6 A trial court's authority to suspend an attorney's license to practice in a particular court or action is a
result of its inherent authority to manage the courtroom. 177 Contrarily, an award of attorneys' fees merely punishes the attorney
and compensates the opposing party."'7 Therefore, the trial court
had no inherent authority upon which to base such an award.' 7 9
The supreme court agreed with the plaintiffs' attorney and reversed the trial court's award. 8 0 Pursuant to the court's decision
in Lannon v. Lee Conner Realty Corp.,' trial courts have no authority to sanction a party litigant based on costs and attorneys'
fees. 182 Likewise, the trial court erred in awarding attorneys' fees
against a litigant's counsel. 183 Moreover, an assessment of fees
against an opposing party or counsel-without statutory or contractual authority-violated the "American rule" against recovery

171. Id. at 391, 641 S.E.2d at 496.
172. See id. at 392, 641 S.E.2d at 497.
173. See id. at 394-95, 641 S.E.2d at 498-99 (explaining the different accounts of the
attorneys' conduct).
174. Id. at 395-97, 641 S.E.2d at 499. The trial court initially declined to award sanctions, but it reversed the decision on defendants' motion to reconsider. Id. at 396-97, 641
S.E.2d at 499-500.
175. Id. at 397, 641 S.E.2d at 500.
176. Id. at 398, 641 S.E.2d at 500-01.
177. See id. at 399, 641 S.E.2d at 501.
178. See id. at 400, 641 S.E.2d at 502.
179. Id. at 400-01, 641 S.E.2d at 502.
180. Id.
181. 238 Va. 590, 385 S.E.2d 380 (1989).
182. See Nusbaum, 273 Va. at 399-400, 641 S.E.2d at 501.
183. Id. at 400, 641 S.E.2d at 502.
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of attorneys' fees."8 4 The trial court's sanction award was designed solely to 5 punish the plaintiffs' attorney and it was there18
fore improper.
J. Standing
In Campbell v. Harmon, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled
that a decedent's personal representative has standing to assert
any cause of action existing at the time of the decedent's death
pursuant to section 8.01-25."'6 The plaintiff in Campbell was the
personal representative of the estate of the decedent who was a
lifetime beneficiary of a trust.1 8 7 Plaintiff filed suit against the
trustees seeking an accounting of the trust administration pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-31, which grants the trial court
authority to order an accounting at the request of the beneficiary.18 1 Plaintiff asserted standing based on the survival provisions of Virginia Code section 8.01-25."89 The trial court ruled
that Plaintiff lacked standing because the will did not incorporate
any right to an accounting under Virginia Code section 8.01-31 on
behalf of the personal representative.' 9 0
The supreme court reversed the trial court's decision, ruling
that the clear language of Virginia Code section 8.01-25 states the
General Assembly's intent that "Ie]very cause of action whether
legal or equitable, which is cognizable in the Commonwealth of
Virginia, shall survive . .. the death of the person in whose favor
the cause of action existed."19 Therefore, assuming the decedent's
beneficiary had a right to an accounting under Virginia Code section 8.01-31, the personal representative had standing to assert a
similar claim after the decedent's death. 9 2 The court rejected the
defendant trustees' attempt to limit the types of actions that sur-

184. See id., 641 S.E.2d at 501.
185. Id. at 400-01, 641 S.E.2d at 502. Interestingly, the court indicated by citations to
unfavorable caselaw that its decision appears to be at odds with the Supreme Court of the
United States' decision in Chamber v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), and other state
supreme court decisions. See id. at 401, 641 S.E.2d at 502.
186. 271 Va. 590, 601, 628 S.E.2d 308, 314 (2006).
187. Id. at 593, 628 S.E.2d at 309.
188. Id. at 595, 628 S.E.2d at 310.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 596, 628 S.E.2d at 311.
191. Id. at 598, 628 S.E.2d at 312.
192. See id. at 598-99, 628 S.E.2d at 312.
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vive an individual's death to those specifically preserved by statute. 193 Accordingly, the personal representative had standing to
demand an accounting from the trustees because the cause of action existed at the time of the decedent's death. 194
K. Statute of Limitations
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently addressed several matters involving statutes of limitation. In Harmon v. Sadjadi, the
court held that the one-year statute of limitations in Virginia
Code section 8.01-229(B)(1) for claims brought on behalf of an estate accrues on the date the plaintiff qualifies as personal representative within Virginia.1 95 In so holding, the court reversed its
earlier decision in McDaniel v. North CarolinaPulp Co. 196
Plaintiff qualified as personal representative of the decedent's
estate in West Virginia and then improperly filed suit in Virginia
on behalf of the estate.' 97 After nonsuiting her initial claim, the
administration of the estate in West Virginia closed, and the
plaintiff was discharged of her representation."'9 She then qualified as personal representative of the estate in Virginia, and filed
a second lawsuit on behalf of the estate alleging the same cause of
action.' 99 The trial court granted the defendant's special plea of
the one-year statute of limitations and dismissed the claim.2 °°
Specifically, the trial court held that the statutory period began to
run when Plaintiff qualified as personal representative in West
Virginia. 2"' The trial court further held that the period was tolled
by Plaintiff filing her first lawsuit.20 2 The tolling ceased when the
administration of the estate in West Virginia closed.20 3 Conse-

193. Id.
194. See id. at 601, 628 S.E.2d at 314. The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
the plaintiffs request for an accounting as to the decedent's personal property allegedly
taken by the trustees, citing a lack of standing for any such action. Id. at 601-02, 628
S.E.2d at 314.
195. See 213 Va. 184, 198, 639 S.E.2d 294, 302 (2007).
196. Id. at 192-93, 639 S.E.2d at 299 (overruling McDaniel v. North Carolina Pulp Co.,
198 Va. 612, 95 S.E.2d 201 (1956)).
197. See id. at 187, 639 S.E.2d at 295.
198. Id.
199. Id., 634 S.E.2d at 295-96.
200. Id. at 187-88, 639 S.E.2d at 296.
201. See id. at 188, 639 S.E.2d at 296.
202. See id.
203. Id.
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quently, according to the trial court, Plaintiffs second lawsuit
was filed outside of the one-year period provided by section 8.01229(B)( 1).204
In reaching its decision, the trial court relied on McDaniel. °5
In McDaniel, the court explained that the plaintiffs qualified as
personal representatives of the decedent in Nevada. 0 6 The court
in McDaniel held that the "statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of an action filed by a personal representative
who is qualified in a foreign jurisdiction, but not qualified in Virginia, because 'the real party in interest remained the same.' 20 7
In applying McDaniel, the trial court held by implication that the
meant
term "qualification" in Virginia Code section2 08.01-229(B)(1)
8
qualification in any state, not only Virginia.
The court reversed McDaniel based on the doctrine of standing,
holding that a foreign administrator or representative lacks
standing to bring an action within the Commonwealth.2 9 It is
clear that "when a party without standing brings a legal action,
the action so instituted is, in effect, a legal nullity."2 10 Therefore,
the filing of an action by a foreign representative has no effect on
the one-year period for bringing suit under Virginia Code section
8.01-229(B)(1). 21' This is because the plaintiffs qualification as
personal representative in West Virginia and her filing of the
original lawsuit had no legal effect on her ability to file suit
against the defendant.2 12 The one-year statutory period commenced when the plaintiff qualified in Virginia as the personal
representative and so her lawsuit was timely filed.213

204. Id. Virginia Code section 8.01-229(B)(1) allows the personal representative to file
suit either within the time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations on the underlying claim or within one year of the individual's qualification as personal representative,
whichever is later. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
205. Harmon, 213 Va. at 188, 639 S.E.2d at 296.
206. See id. at 192, 639 S.E.2d at 298 (citing McDaniel, 198 Va. at 613-14, 95 S.E.2d at
202-03).
207. Id. (quoting McDaniel, 198 Va. at 619-20, 95 S.E.2d at 206-07).
208. Id.
209. See id. at 197, 639 S.E.2d at 301. After reviewing all of its own citations to the
McDaniel decision, the court held that the decision was "clearly a mistake and a flagrant
error" and, notwithstanding the doctrine of stare decisis, was reversible. Id. at 192-97, 639
S.E.2d at 299-302.
210. Id. at 193, 639 S.E.2d at 299.
211. Id. at 198, 639 S.E.2d at 302.
212. Id.
213. Id. The court held that the term "qualification" must refer to qualification in the
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In Restaurant Co. v. United Leasing Corp., the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that the assumption of an unexpired lease in a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan did not affect the plaintiff leasing
company's ability to sue the sureties. 21 4 The debtor on the lease
defaulted on its obligations two years before filing Chapter 11
bankruptcy. 21 5 The bankruptcy court confirmed the debtor's reorganization plan, which provided for the debtor to assume the
lease in its entirety.2 16 The debtor continued to default on the
lease after confirmation of the plan and the lessor filed suit
against the sureties. 21 7 The trial court rejected the defendant
sureties' special plea of the statute of limitations, holding that the
statutory period commenced to run at the time of the debtor's
first default after confirmation of the bankruptcy plan.21 8
The supreme court disagreed, ruling that the assumption of an
unexpired lease in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan was not tantamount to executing a new lease.21 9 Although bankruptcy law
treats a pre-petition unexpired lease "the same as a new, postpetition lease, for purposes of establishing the priority of payments from the bankruptcy estate in the event the reorganization
is unsuccessful," the assumption did not create any new promises,
obligations, or rights between the parties.2 20 Therefore, the fouryear statute of limitations for filing suit against the sureties began to run when the debtor first defaulted on its obligations to
the lessor. 221 Because the lessor's lawsuit against the sureties was
default, it was barred
not filed until seven years after the initial
222
by the four-year statute of limitations.
In Newman v. Walker, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
a defendant's affirmative misrepresentation of his identity may
toll the applicable statute of limitations pursuant to Virginia

Commonwealth, as any other reading could result in the one-year period ending before the
representative could file suit-a result that made little sense and would only frustrate the
General Assembly's purpose in codifying Virginia Code section 8.01-229(B)(1). See id.
214. See 271 Va. 529, 532-33, 628 S.E.2d 520, 521 (2006).
215. See id. at 534, 628 S.E.2d at 522.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 534-35, 628 S.E.2d at 522.
219. See id. at 541, 628 S.E.2d at 526.
220. Id. at 538, 628 S.E.2d at 524.
221. Id. at 539, 628 S.E.2d at 525.
222. Id. at 540, 628 S.E.2d at 525. The court ruled further that the debtor's bankruptcy
did not toll the lessor's claims against the sureties. Id. at 540-41, 628 S.E.2d at 525-26.
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Code section 8.01-229(D). 22 3 After an automobile accident, the defendant provided the attending police officer with false identification .2 4 Based on this information, the plaintiff filed suit naming
the falsely-identified individual as the party-defendant. 225 Plaintiff discovered her error and amended the motion for judgment,
naming the correct defendant.22 6 Unfortunately, the correct defendant was not named as a party defendant within the two-year
statute of limitations for personal injury claims,2 27 and consequently, the trial court granted the uninsured motorist carrier's
motion to dismiss the action for untimeliness.2 28
The trial court relied on Grimes v. Suzukawa 229 in holding that
the defendant's misrepresentation did not constitute a "direct or
indirect" means of obstructing plaintiffs action as required by
Virginia Code section 8.01-229(D).2 3 ° In Grimes, the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that an assailant's concealment of his identity by wearing a mask did not constitute direct or indirect obstruction of a plaintiffs filing a cause of action. 23 1 The defendant
in Newman contended that because his use of false identification
was similar to the assailant's use of a mask in Grimes (i.e., not
used to obstruct the filing of an action) it did not constitute the
"affirmative misrepresentation" required by Virginia Code section
8:01-229(D).2 3 2
The supreme court rejected this comparison, ruling that while
the defendant offered the false identification to conceal his identity, he also affirmatively misrepresented his identity to the po-

223. 270 Va. 291, 293, 618 S.E.2d 336, 336 (2005).
224. Id., 618 S.E.2d at 336-37.
225. Id., 618 S.E.2d at 337.
226. Id. at 294, 618 S.E.2d at 337. Plaintiff first amended the complaint to name William Walker, Jr. as the defendant based on information from defendant's former employer.
Id. Plaintiff discovered that this also was a false name, and she amended the motion for
judgment again, naming Leonard Walker, Jr. as the defendant. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. 262 Va. 330, 551 S.E.2d 644 (2001).
230. Newman, 270 Va. at 294, 618 S.E.2d at 337. Virginia Code section 8:01-229(D)
states, in part, "[wihen the filing of an action is obstructed by a defendant's ... [use of
any] direct or indirect means to obstruct the filing of an action, then the time that such
obstruction has continued shall not be counted as any part of the period within which the
action must be brought." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(D) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
231. Newman, 270 Va. at 297-98, 618 S.E.2d at 339.
232. Id. at 295, 618 S.E.2d at 338.
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lice officer.2 33 The defendant thus "'undertook an affirmative
act.' 234 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's decision
and remanded the matter to determine whether the defendant's
use of the identification was indirectly or directly designed to obstruct the filing of plaintiffs cause of action and, if so, the period
of time such obstruction continued. 235
L. Venue
In Barnett v. Kite, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that in
determining proper venue, the trial courts should consider the affairs and business activity of a corporation as separate and distinct from the activities of a named party defendant who is a majority shareholder of that corporation. 23 6 The plaintiff filed suit in
the Richmond City Circuit Court against the individual defendant, alleging assault and battery for an incident that occurred in
Powhatan County.23 7 The defendant's only connection to Richmond was his majority shareholder status in a closely held corpo238
ration which conducted business and advertised in the city.
Nonetheless, the trial court overruled the defendant's objection to
venue because the corporation "advertised its business in media
239
that reached the City's general population."
After losing a jury trial, the defendant appealed, asserting that
the trial court's decision effectively treated the defendant and the
third-party corporation as "one and the same."24 The supreme
court agreed, ruling that Virginia Code section 8.01-262 "unambiguously refers to the affairs or business activity conducted by 'the
defendant,' not to the affairs or business activity conducted by a
241
corporation in which the defendant is a majority shareholder."
Indeed, as long as the corporation at issue was not "held to be the
alter ego, alias, stooge, or dummy of the individual shareholder,"
the activities of the corporation have no bearing on the question

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 298, 618 S.E.2d at 339.
Id. (quoting Grimes, 262 Va. at 332, 551 S.E.2d at 646).
Id., 618 S.E.2d at 340.
See 271 Va. 65, 70-71, 624 S.E.2d 52, 54-55 (2006).
Id. at 67, 624 S.E.2d at 53.
See id. at 67-68, 624 S.E.2d at 53-54.
Id. at 68-69, 624 S.E.2d at 54.
Id. at 69, 624 S.E.2d at 54.
Id. at 70, 624 S.E.2d at 54.
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of venue.242 The evidence showed that the defendant traveled occasionally to Richmond only to meet his attorney. 24 3 These contacts did not support a finding of proper venue, and therefore the
trial court's decision was reversed.2 44
M. Waiver of Objections
In Bitar v. Rahman, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a
defendant waived any objection to a medical expert's testimony
not stated within a "reasonable degree of medical probability" because the defendant failed to make a contemporaneous objection. 245 The plaintiff in Bitar sued the defendant for medical malpractice after the plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries related to a
plastic surgery procedure. 246 During trial, the plaintiff called a
medical expert in the field of plastic surgery to testify as to the
standard of care and the defendant's negligence.2 47 The expert
was never asked whether his opinions were given to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty.2 48 At the close of the presentation of
all evidence, the defendant moved to strike the expert's testimony
and to enter judgment in favor of the defendant. 249 The trial court
denied the motion to strike, citing the general rule that "'the appropriate time for [the motion to strike] was at the time the witness offered the opinion[,] . . .not after the opinion is in the record.' 25 °
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision.25 ' Medical expert testimony must be given to a "reasonable degree of
medical probability." 2 2 "[An objection based on the fact that a
medical expert's opinion is not stated to a reasonable degree of
medical probability, lacks an adequate factual foundation, or fails
to consider all the relevant variables challenges the admissibility

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
tion).
251.
252.

See id., 624 S.E.2d at 55.

Id.
Id. at 70-71, 624 S.E.2d at 55.
272 Va. 130, 142, 630 S.E.2d 319, 326 (2006).
See id. at 133-34, 630 S.E.2d at 321.
See id. at 134-35, 630 S.E.2d at 321-22.
See id. at 137, 630 S.E.2d at 323.
Id. at 135, 630 S.E.2d at 322.
Id. at 136, 630 S.E.2d at 322-23 (quoting the trial court's order denying the moId. at 143, 630 S.E.2d at 326.
Id. at 138, 630 S.E.2d at 323.
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of evidence rather than the sufficiency of evidence."25 3 Objections
to admissibility must be raised contemporaneously with the offending evidence.2 54 Contrarily, a motion to strike made at the
close of the plaintiffs case in chief attacks the sufficiency of the
plaintiffs evidence against the defendant. 25 5 "' [A] litigant may
not, in a motion to strike [the evidence], raise for the first time a
question of admissibility of evidence."'2 56 As a result, because the
defendant did not object at the time of the expert's testimony, any
subsequent objection could not be the basis for a motion to strike
the plaintiffs claim.2 57
In Lyren v. Ohr, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that a defendant waived the one-year service requirement in Rule 3:3(c) by
filing grounds of defense without objecting to the court's jurisdiction. 25 ' Rule 3:3(c) states that "[n]o judgment shall be entered
against a defendant who was served with process more than one
year after the commencement of the action against him unless
the court finds as a fact that the plaintiff exercised due diligence
to have timely service on him.' 259 The plaintiff in Lyren failed to
effect proper service of process on the defendant within one year
of filing the lawsuit. 2" Nonetheless, the defendant filed grounds
of defense based, at least in part, on the plaintiffs counsel's assurances that the lawsuit had been timely served.261
The supreme court reversed the trial court's decision dismissing the claim based on Rule 3:3(c).262 Notwithstanding the plaintiffs attorney's statements regarding the filing of the claim, the
court held that the defendant surrendered to the personal jurisdiction of the trial court by making a general appearance without
objecting to the court's jurisdiction.2 63 A general appearance '"is a
waiver of process, equivalent to personal service of process, and

253. Id. at 139, 630 S.E.2d at 324.
254. Id. (citing Kondaurov v. Kerdosha, 271 Va. 646, 655, 629 S.E.2d 181, 185 (2006)).
255. See id. at 140, 630 S.E.2d at 325.
256. Id. (citing Woodson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 285, 288, 176 S.E.2d 818, 821
(1970)).
257. See id. at 142, 630 S.E.2d at 326.
258. See 271 Va. 155, 160, 623 S.E.2d 883, 885 (2006).
259. Id. at 158, 623 S.E.2d at 884 (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:3(c)).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 157, 160, 623 S.E.2d at 883-84, 885.
262. Id. at 161, 623 S.E.2d at 885.
263. Id. at 160, 623 S.E.2d at 885.
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confers jurisdiction of the person on the court."'2 64 By pleading to
the merits of plaintiffs claim, the defendant was thus precluded
from asserting the protection of the time-bar provided in Rule
3:3(c).265
III. RULE CHANGES
On June 13, 2005, the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted several amendments to the Rules. For example, Rule 5A:5, regarding
the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, was
completely re-written.26 6 The Rule now states that all original actions in the court of appeals are to be conducted in accordance
with Rule 5:7, except no responsive pleadings are required in actions brought by prisoners pro se, and it outlines the specific procedures for filing a petition for a writ of actual innocence.2 6 7 Additionally, Rules 5A:20 and 5A:21 were amended to substitute
references to Rule 5A:19(e) with references to Rule 5A:19(f).26 s
By far the most significant amendment, however, was the supreme court's amendment of Part Three of the Rules and Rules
4:0, 4:5, 4:7, and 4:8, which reflects the merger of law and equity
in Virginia courts. 26 9 Former Part Three of the Rules, including
Rules 3:1 through 3:19, was entirely repealed and a new Part
Three, Rules 3:1 through 3:23, was adopted.2 7 ° Stylistic changes
were also made to Rules 4:0, 4:5, 4:7, and 4:8 to conform with the
terminology consistent with the
new Part Three and to include
271
merger of law and equity.
On July 21, 2005, the Supreme Court of Virginia amended the
Appendix of Forms to Part 5A by adopting Form 12, a "Petition
for Writ of Actual Innocence Based on Nonbiological Evidence," to
be effective August 15, 2005.272

264. Id. at 159, 623 S.E.2d at 885 (quoting Gilpin v. Joyce, 257 Va. 579, 581, 515 S.E.2d
124, 125 (1999)).
265. Id. at 160, 623 S.E.2d at 885.
266. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:5.
267. See id.
268. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:20-21.
269. See generally W. Hamilton Bryson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: The Merger of
Common Law and Equity Pleading in Virginia, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 77 (2006).

270.
271.
272.

See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:1-3:23.
See VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:0,4:5, 4:7,4:8.
See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:f-12.
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On August 29, 2005, Rule 4:5, regarding the taking of oral
depositions, was amended to allow the court, for good cause, to
designate the place of a party or nonparty deposition. 27 3 The Rule
states that "[glood cause may include the expense or inconvenience of a non-resident party defendant appearing in one of the
locations" permitted under the Rule.27 4
Important amendments were also made to Rule 3:23 regarding
the use of, and proceedings before, a Commissioner in Chancery. 27 5 The rule now states that any matter, not only equitable
claims, may be referred to a Commissioner in Chancery. 27 6 Further, a new subparagraph was inserted and provides that Commissioners in Chancery may be appointed in circuit court cases,
"including uncontested divorce cases, only when (1) there is
agreement by the parties with concurrence of the court or (2)
upon motion of a party or the court on its own motion with a finding of good cause shown in each individual case."2 77 Finally, the
amendment made minor stylistic changes to the Rule.2 78
An amendment to Rule 4:4 extended its provisions on stipulations regarding discovery to non-party witnesses, providing that
"[s]tipulations may include agreements with non-party witnesses,
"
A technical
consistent with [Virginia] Code § 8.01-420.4. 1279
rethat
stipulations
also
clarified
of
the
Rule
change at the end
also be filed along with the depositions
garding discovery should 280
and completed discovery.
On October 21, 2005, the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted a
number of amendments which extended previous amendments to
certain Rules regarding denials of appeal and petitions for rehearing in the court of appeals; the rules had been set to expire
on December 31, 2005.281 The amendments deleted the December

273. VA. SuP. CT. R. 4:5(al).
274. Id.
275. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:23.
276. See id. 3:23(b).
277. Id. (emphasis added).
278. See id.
279. VA. SuP. CT. R. 4:4.
280. Id.
281. Rules 5:20, 5:39, 5:39A, 5A:15A, 5A:33, 5A:33A, 5A:34, 5A:34A were amended. See
Amendments to the Rules of Court, Supreme Court of Virginia (Oct. 21, 2005), http://
www.courts.state.va.us/scv/amendments/102105_scvcav_ pfrrules.pdf.
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31, 2005 sunset provisions from these Rules, effective January 1,
2006.282
As discussed in greater detail in the University of Richmond
Law Review's 2005 Annual Survey, the amendments primarily
stated new technical requirements for the filing of petitions for
rehearing with the court of appeals, including changes to formatting, certifications of service and compliance with word-count
limit, method of filing, and time of filing. 283
On February 28, 2006, the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted
a number of amendments.2 " The language of Rules 4:2, 4:8, 4:9,
4:11, 7B:3, 7B:4, and 7B:10 was amended to reflect and conform
with the merger of law and equity.2 S5
Additionally, several amendments were made to Rule 1A:5, setting forth the regulations applicable to Virginia corporate counsel. 2 6 First, the fee for obtaining a corporate counsel certificate
and for registering as a corporate counsel registrant was raised
from $50.00 to $150.00.287 Second, Part I, subsection f, forbidding
corporate counsel from practicing law in Virginia except for the
corporate counsel's employer, was amended to include a specific
exception allowing pro bono practice in a Virginia State Bar program and under the supervision of a supervising attorney.28 8
Third, in Part II, a new subsection g was added, requiring corporate counsel registrants to promptly notify the Virginia State Bar
of changes in employment or bar membership, or imposition of
any disciplinary sanctions.2 9
New Rule 1:6, "Res Judicata Claim Preclusion," was added to
Part One of the Rules. 29 0 The Court also adopted new Rule 3:24,

282. Id.
283. See John R. Walk & Michael R. Spitzer, II, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Civil
Practice and Procedure, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 95, 129-31 (2005) (detailing the technical
changes made to the rules).
284. See Amendments to the Rules of Court, Supreme Court of Virginia (Feb. 28, 2006),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/amendments/2006_0228_rule-4-2.pdf.
285. See id.
286. Amendments to the Rules of Court, Supreme Court of Virginia (Feb. 28, 2006),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/amendments/2006_0228_rule la-5.pdf.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Amendments to the Rules of Court, Supreme Court of Virginia (Feb. 28, 2006),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/amendments/2006-0228_final_1 6 rule.pdf.
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regarding the "Appeal of Orders of Quarantine or Isolation regarding Communicable Diseases of Public Health Threat," which
became effective May 1, 2006.291 The Rule provides procedures for
appealing an order of quarantine, issued pursuant to Virginia
Code section 32.1-48.09, and for appealing an order of isolation,
issued pursuant to Virginia Code section 32.1-48.012.292 The appeals must be made to the appropriate circuit court and are governed by Virginia Code section 32.1-48.010 for quarantine orders,
by section 32.1-48.013 for isolation orders, and also by related
sections of Article 3.02 of Title 32.1 for both types of orders.2 93
Subsection C of the rule permits the circuit court to take appropriate precautions, such as hearing appeals by telephone or video
conference or issuing an order requiring participants to wear personal protective equipment, to protect the health and safety of all
individuals involved and the general public.2 94
Finally, Rules 3:4, 3:8, 3:9, and 3:10 were amended to reflect
the new provision in Virginia Code section 8.01-286.1 that permits a circuit court plaintiff to ask a defendant to waive service of
process in the commencement of the complaint.295 Under
amended Rule 3:4, if the defendant waives service pursuant to
Virginia Code section 8.01-286.1, the plaintiff need not provide
the clerk of court with a copy of the complaint for each defendant.29 6 Under amended Rules 3:8, 3:9, and 3:10, if the defendant
waives service of process, the time for the filing of responsive
pleadings, counterclaims, and cross-claims is extended from
twenty-one days to within sixty days of the date when the request
for waiver was sent if the defendant is within the Commonwealth, or within ninety days of the date the waiver was sent if
the defendant is outside the Commonwealth.297

291. Amendments to the Rules of Court, Supreme Court of Virginia (Feb. 28, 2006),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/amendments/2006_0228-quarantine-order_3-24.pdf.
292. VA. SuP. CT. R. 3:24(A)-(B).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Amendments to the Rules of Court, Supreme Court of Virginia (Feb. 28, 2006),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/amendments/2006 0228_final 3.A order.pdf.
296. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:4.
297. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:8, 3:9, 3:10.
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Effective July 11, 2006, Rules 5A:6 and 5A:11 were amended to
increase the filing fee for a Notice of Appeal to the supreme court
from $25.00 to $50.00.298
Rule 3A:9(c) was amended on October 31, 2006 to include an
exception for special sessions of court held pursuant to Virginia
Code section 17.1-304.299
On November 28, 2006, the supreme court added Form 1, "Application to appear Pro Hac Vice Before a Virginia Tribunal," to
Part 1A of the rules.3 °°
On December 20, 2006, the supreme court amended additional
rules. Stylistic changes were made to Rules 3:2 and 5:17.3"1 Technical amendments were made to subsection g of Rule 5:7A, regarding the page limits of petitions for writs of habeas corpus.30 2
Rule 3:21 was amended by adding a provision that the court may
set a final date for service of jury demands in a civil action.3 3
Rule 3:22 was amended by adding a provision stating that in
cases of mixed jury and non-jury claims, the court shall adopt a
trial sequence and procedures to assure all claims are properly
heard and decided by the jury or court, as appropriate.3 4
IV. RECENT LEGISLATION
A. Parties
The General Assembly adopted an amendment regarding certification of expert witnesses in medical malpractice actions, which
298. Amendments to the Rules of Court, Supreme Court of Virginia (July 11, 2006),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/amendments/07 11_06 rule-5a-6.pdf.
299. Amendments to the Rules of Court, Supreme Court of Virginia (Oct. 31, 2006),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/amendments/2006 1031_rule-change-3a9-5-2.pdf.
300. Amendments to the Rules of Court, Supreme Court of Virginia (Nov. 28, 2006),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/amendments/2006_1128_rule change_1a4_forml.pdf.
301. Amendments to the Rules of Court, Supreme Court of Virginia (Dec. 20, 2006),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/amendments/2007-03 01_rule_3A_21_1_rule 3_2 rule_
3 21 rule- 3 22.pdf; Amendments to the Rules of Court, Supreme Court of Virginia (Dec.
20, 2006), http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/amendments/2007-02-01-rule_5-17_5 35_5A
_ 2_5A_28.pdf.
302. Amendments to the Rules of Court, Supreme Court of Virginia (Dec. 20, 2006),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/amendments/20070301-rule-5-7A.pdf.
303. See Amendments to the Rules of Court, Supreme Court of Virginia (Dec. 20, 2006),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/amendments/2007-03 01_rule_3A_21_1_rule_3_2_rule_
3 21_rule 3 22.pdf.
304. Id.
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effected changes to Virginia Code sections 8.01-20.1, 8.01-50.1,
and 16.1-83.1. 305 The amendment clarifies that when a plaintiff
requests service of process, or requests the defendant accept service of process, the defendant has certified that he has obtained
an expert who opines that the defendant has deviated from the
applicable standard of care.3 °6 The amendment also clarifies that
neither the certifying expert's identity, nor the expert's "qualifications" are discoverable, except pursuant to Rule 4:1 if the expert
is expected to testify at trial.3 °7
B. Actions
An amendment to Virginia Code section 8.01-35.1 broadens the
applicability of the section, regarding the effect of a covenant not
to sue, to include all injuries to persons or property, or wrongful
death.30 8 The amendment deleted language that previously made
the section inapplicable to certain torts.30 9
New Virginia Code section 8.01-44.7 states that a provider of
utility services that have been tampered with or diverted has a
cause of action for both injunctive and equitable relief, and damages plus reasonable attorneys fees and costs for the greater of
actual damages or $500.310
An amendment regarding the removal of property pursuant to
an ejectment proceeding affected Virginia Code sections 8.01-156,
55-237.1, and 55-248.38.2.311 The amendments clarified that a
sheriff does not have a duty to actually effect the removal, but
must oversee the process, and the amendment also provides that
neither the sheriff nor the owner of the real property at issue may
be liable for any personal property removed. 312

305. Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 489, 2007 Va. Acts 663 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-20.1, -50.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-83.1 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
306. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-20.1, -50.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-83.1
(Repl. Vol. 2003).
307. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-20.1, -50.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-83.1
(Cum. Supp. 2007).
308. See id. § 8.01-35.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
309. Id.
310. See id. § 8.01-44.7 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
311. Id. § 8.01-156 (Repl. Vol. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-237.1, -248.38:2 (Repl. Vol.
2007).
312. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-156 (Repl. Vol. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-237.1,
-248.38:2 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
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Virginia Code sections 8.01-195.6, 8.01-222, and 15.2-209 were
amended to reflect changes in the proper submission procedures
and form of a notice of claim against the Commonwealth, a transportation district, or a local government entity.3 13
New Virginia Code section 8.01-223.2 provides civil immunity
to any citizen appearing at "a public hearing before the governing
body of any locality or other political subdivision, or the boards,
commissions, agencies and authorities thereof, and other governing bodies of any local governmental entity" for any "claim of tortious interference with an existing contract or a business or contractual expectancy based solely on statements made by that
person at [the] public hearing."3 14
Pre-existing Virginia Code section 8.01-226.7, regarding compliance with residential lead-based paint notification and immunity for lead-based paint poisoning, was amended to provide immunity to the owner or agent of residential property if the owner
or agent informs the purchaser or tenant of all known lead-based
paint and/or lead-based paint hazards before the purchase or
lease is executed.3 15 The duty to inform continues throughout the
tenancy.3 16 Further, the amendment provides that a hearing on
asserting the immunity may be held beany responsive pleading
17
fore the case-in-chief.
Virginia Code section 8.01-226.8 previously afforded civil immunity to public officials and private volunteers participating in
any roadway litter pick-up program for any liability to any probationers participating in the same program. 18 A 2007 amendment
to this section extends the civil immunity for public officials and
private volunteers to cover any programs involving recycling duties at landfills, garbage transfer sites, and other waste disposal
systems.3 1 9
New Virginia Code section 8.01-226.11 provides civil immunity
for the Virginia Sheriffs' Association and Virginia Community Po-

313. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.6, 8.01-222 (Repl. Vol. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. §
15.2-209 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
314. Id. § 8.01-223.2 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
315. See id. § 8.01-226.7 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
316. Id. § 8.01-226.7(B)(5) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
317. Id. § 8.01-226.7(D) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
318. See id. § 8.01-226.8 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
319. See § 8.01-226.8 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
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licing Institute, and their directors, members, managers, officers,
and employees, for acts or omissions not resulting from gross negligence or willful misconduct that relate to establishing and operating any automated victim notification system.3 2 °
C. Limitations of Actions
Existing Virginia Code section 8.01-232 was amended to make
all written promises not to plead the statute of limitations valid
only "when (i) it is made to avoid or defer litigation pending settlement of any case, (ii) it is not made contemporaneously with any
other contract, and (iii) it is made for an additional term not
longer than the applicablelimitationsperiod."32 1
D. Venue
Pre-existing Virginia Code section 8.01-265 was amended to allow any party, not only the defendant, to move for a change of
venue, and to allow any party to oppose such motion.32 2 The
amendment also provided that compliance with the law of any
other state or the United States shall be deemed to constitute
good cause for which a motion for transfer of venue may be
granted.323
E. Civil Actions; Commencement, Pleadings,and Motions
Virginia Code section 8.01-277 was amended to allow any defendant upon whom process has not been served within one year
of the filing of an action to move by special appearance for dismissal of the action.32 4 If the court finds the plaintiff did not exercise due diligence to effect timely service, the court shall dismiss
the action with prejudice.3 25 If the court finds the plaintiff did exercise due diligence, the court shall deny the motion to dismiss
and order the defendant to file a responsive pleading within
twenty-one days of the ruling.3 26 The amendment also preserves
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. § 8.01-226.11 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
Id. § 8.01-232 (Repl. Vol. 2007) (emphasis added).
See id. § 8.01-265 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
Id.
Id. § 8.01-277 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
Id. § 8.01-277(B) (Repl.' Vol. 2007).
Id.
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the plaintiffs right to file a nonsuit before the entry of an order to
dismiss and provides that nothing in the amendment shall apply
to actions involving asbestos.327
F. Personal Jurisdictionin CertainActions
Virginia Code section 8.01-328.1, Virginia's long-arm statute,
was amended to provide that courts of the Commonwealth have
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in actions where the nonresident owes a local tax, fine, penalty, interest, or similar charge
in the Commonwealth.3 28
G. Dockets
Existing Virginia Code section 8.01-335 was amended to add a
subsection allowing the court to order a discontinuance of an action for failure of the plaintiff to serve process within a year of filing.3 29 At least thirty days prior to entry of the order, the court
must give the plaintiff notice, providing an opportunity to prove
that either service was timely effected, or the plaintiff exercised
due diligence to have it timely effected. 33 0 If the plaintiff succeeds
in proving either of these, the discontinuance order shall not be
entered and the action remains on the court's docket. 331 The
amendment similarly does not apply to asbestos cases.3 32
H. Juries
Amendments to Virginia Code sections 8.01-187, 8.01-345,
8.01-346, and 25.1-229, relating to condemnation proceedings,
provide that jury selections in condemnation cases shall now be
conducted in accordance with Virginia Code section 8.01-336. 333
The amendments further provide that a condemnation jury shall

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id.
Id. § 8.01-328.1 (A)(10) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
Id. § 8.01-335(D) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
Id.
Id.

332.

Id.

333. Id. § 8.01-187, -345, -346 (Repl. Vol. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-229(A) (Supp.
2007).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:229

consist of at least five jurors, from a panel334of at least thirteen,
and the court may appoint alternate jurors.
Technical amendments were made to Virginia Code sections
8.01-343 and 17.1-105 to clarify that what was formerly known as
the "common law order book" is now known as the "civil order
book."33 5
I. Certain Incidents of Trial
An amendment to Virginia Code section 8.01-375 provides that
in civil proceedings to determine child or spousal support, upon
motion of a party, the court may allow one expert witness for each
party to remain in the courtroom throughout the proceedings.3 36
An amendment to Virginia Code section 8.01-380, governing
nonsuit procedures, provides that if, after the plaintiffs initial
nonsuit of right, the court grants an additional nonsuit, it must
provide reasonable notice of the allowance to all counsels of record for all defendants and must make a reasonable attempt to
3 37
provide notice of the allowance to all unrepresented parties.
This amendment is notable because the court previously was not
required to provide notice of the allowance to any of the defendants. 33' Further, the amendment provides that the party seeking
a nonsuit must inform the court of any previous nonsuits the
party has taken in the action, and an order entering an additional
nonsuit must include the number and dates of any previous non339
suits.
J. Evidence
New Virginia Code section 8.01-391.1 states that any check
created pursuant to the Federal Check Clearing for the 21st Century Evidence Act ("Check 21 Act"), providing for an official copy

334. VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-229(B) (Supp. 2007).
335. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-343 (Repl. Vol. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-105 (Cum.
Supp. 2007).
336. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-375 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
337. Id. § 8.01-380(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
338. See supra Part II.F.; see also Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 366-67, 634 S.E.2d
754, 760-61 (2006).
339. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
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of an original check, is admissible in evidence to the same extent
as the original check. 4 °
Previously existing Virginia Code section 8.01-404, regarding
contradiction of a witness by a prior inconsistent writing, generally provided that in a personal injury or wrongful death action,
extrajudicial recordings of a witness were not admissible to contradict the testimony of that witness.3 41 The 2007 amendment to
this section provides, however, that extrajudicial recordings made
at the time of the wrongful act or negligence at issue may be used
to contradict the testimony of the witness.34 2
An amendment to existing Virginia Code section 8.01-407, regarding witness subpoenas to judicial officers, provides that when
this type of subpoena is served less than five days before the date
the appearance of the judicial officer is requested, and when the
judicial officer would generally be incompetent to testify under
Virginia Code section 19.2-271, the subpoena has no legal force
unless it has been issued by a judge. 4 3
K. Payment and Setoff
Virginia Code section 8.01-419.1 was amended to state that
admissible evidence of the fair market value of a motor vehicle
may be provided not only in the form of the National Automobile
Dealers' Association "yellow" or "black" books, but also by "any
vehicle valuation service regularly used and recognized in the
automobile industry" in effect on the relevant date.3 44
L. Courts Not of Record
Previously, Virginia Code section 16.1-69.55 did not provide
any procedures for satisfaction of a general district court judgment when a judgment creditor could not be located.3 45 A recent
amendment addressed this issue, providing that when a judgment debtor wishes to discharge a judgment pursuant to Virginia

340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id. § 8.01-391.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
Id. § 8.01-404 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
See id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 8.01-407(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
Id. § 8.01-419.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.55 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
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Code section 8.01-456-but cannot locate the judgment creditor, he
may, within the period of enforcement, pay the circuit court docketing and indexing fees on judgments from other courts, and any
other required filing fees to have the judgment docketed in circuit
court.3 46
Pursuant to an amendment to Virginia Code section 16.1-107, a
plaintiff is no longer required to post an appeal bond to appeal
a
34 7
judgment if the defendant has not asserted a counterclaim.
M. Executions and Other Means of Recovery
Virginia Code section 8.01-470 was amended to provide that, if
a party to be served with a writ to recover property is not found
at that property, the sheriff effects service by posting a copy of
the writ on the property's door.34
Virginia Code sections 8.01-471, 55-248.9:1, 55-248.15:2, 55248.21:1, and 55-248.34:1, all relating to the Virginia Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act, were recently amended to reflect
changes in the confidentiality of tenant records.3 49 Generally, a
landlord has a duty to keep tenants' records confidential; these
amendments, however, add two exceptions to this rule.3 5 ° The
landlord may provide information from a tenant's records if the
records are requested pursuant to a subpoena in a civil case, or if
they are requested by a contract purchaser of the landlord's property, provided that the purchaser
agrees in writing to maintain
3 51
the records' confidentiality.
Virginia Code section 8.01-501 was recently amended to extend
to 180 days the time a writ of fieri facias applies to newly acquired property. 35 2 Virginia Code section 8.01-514, which addresses the time period during which a wage garnishment is
valid, was also amended to reflect the same 180 day time pe353
riod.

346. Id. § 16.1-69.55(B)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
347. Id. § 16.1-107 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
348. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-470 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
349. Id. §§ 8.01-471, 55-248.9:1, -248.15:2, -248.21:1, -248.34:1 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
350. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.9:1(A)(6), (7) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
351. Id.
352. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-501 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
353. Id. § 8.01-514 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
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Virginia Code section 20.108-1 was amended to clarify that
while the income of a child support obligor may be garnished, actual child support payments, current or in arrears, are not subject
to garnishment.3 54 Further, a depository of child support payments has no obligation to determine what portion of the deposits
may be subject to garnishment.35 5
N. Medical Malpractice
Recent amendments to several Virginia Code sections relating
to facilitation of the emergency medical services quality of care
initiative made changes relating to civil immunity and privileged
communications for members of monitoring entities.
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17, regarding privileged committees and entities, was amended specifically to provide that any
reports generated as a self-assessment of compliance with the
standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations are privileged and confidential, and are neither
subject to subpoena nor admissible as evidence in any administrative or civil proceeding. 356
Virginia Code sections 8.01-581.18 and 8.01-581.18:1, regarding physicians' civil immunity for reviewing laboratory results
and examinations, were recently amended.35 7 First, the definition
of "physician" was amended to include podiatrists.5 8 Further, the
statutes were amended to state that a physician will not be civilly
liable for failure to review or act on the results of laboratory tests
or examinations if that physician did not order or authorize such
tests or examinations, unless
(i) the report of such results is provided directly to the physician by
the patient so examined or tested with a request for consultation; (ii)
the physician assumes responsibility to review or act on the results;
or (iii) the physician has reason to know that in order to manage the
specific mental or physical condition of the patient, review of or action on the pending results is needed. However, no physician shall be
immune under this section unless the physician establishes that (a)
no physician-patient relationship existed when the results were re-

354.

VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1(G) (Cum. Supp. 2007).

355.
356.
357.
358.

Id.
Id. § 8.01-581.17(I) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
Id. §§ 8.01-581.18, -581.18:1 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
Id. § 8.01-581.18(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
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ceived or accessed; or (b) the physician received or accessed the results without a request for consultation and without responsibility
for management of the specific mental or physical condition of the
patient relating to the results; or (c) the physician consulted on a
specific mental or physical condition, the results were not part of
that physician's management of the patient and the physician had no
reason to know that he was to inform the patient of the results or refer the patient to another physician; or (d) the physician received or
accessed results, the interpretation of which would exceed the physician's scope of practice and the physician had no reason to know that
he was to inform359the patient of the results or refer the patient to another physician.

Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17, relating to privileged communications for physician peer review and physician accreditation entities, was also amended to clarify that the privilege accorded attaches to all of the proceedings, minutes, records,
reports of quality assurance, quality of care, etc., generated by a
peer review committee of a national or state physician peer review entity, or a physician accreditation entity.36 °
Pre-existing Virginia Code section 16.1-88.2 was amended to
allow the same procedures used to introduce medical evidence in
general district court proceedings
to be utilized in actions ap3 61
pealed to circuit courts.
0. Virginia PrisonerLitigationReform Act
Recent amendments to Virginia Code section 8.01-695, and the
addition of sections 8.01-696 and 8.01-697, relating to prisoner
civil litigation, made significant changes to the discovery procedures in such litigation. First, the amendment provides that no
subpoena shall be issued in prisoner civil suits unless reviewed
and authorized by a judge, who retains power to determine the
scope of the subpoena as well as any conditions and terms on
which it should be issued.3 62 Second, at any point after the commencement of a pro se prisoner civil action, any party may move
for summary judgment based on the pleadings, admissions, and
supporting affidavits, and the adverse party may submit support-

359. Id. § 8.01-581.18:1 (Repl. Vol. 2007). For a discussion on the Supreme Court of
Virginia's application of section 8.01-581.18:1, see supra Part II.G.
360. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
361. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-88.2 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
362. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-695 (Repl. Vol. 2007).

2007]

CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

ing affidavits within ten days of service of the motion.36 3 Finally,
all records the Department of Corrections maintains in individual
prisoners' names are the property of the department, although
the "Director of the Department may share any records maintained by the Department in the name of the prisoner filing suit
with counsel representing the above-named defendants."3 64
P. Enforcement of Instruments
Virginia Code section 8.3A-311, when read in conjunction with
section 8.3A-118.1, establishes a six-year statute of limitations for
the enforcement and satisfaction of negotiable instruments. 65
The amendments take effect on January 1, 2007, and will be retroactive. 6 6 Any cause of action accruing after January 1, 1997,
however, will have until January 1, 2013, or until the end of six
years from accrual of the action, whichever is longer, to file
suit.36 7 The amendments further provide that any person tendering a check in full satisfaction of a loan is not acting in good faith
when the amount of the check is less than the full amount due
under the loan, and the check is tendered to a person without
knowledge of any dispute regarding the amount due under the
loan. 368

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. § 8.01-696 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
Id. § 8.01-697 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.3A-118.1, -311 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3A-118.1 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
Id.
Id. § 8.3A-311(a) (Cum. Supp. 2007).

